

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03 SP-02 L-01

IO-03 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 ACDA-10 SAJ-01 PRS-01

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R 291407Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8698

INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY REKJAVIK

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 HELSINKI 01164/01

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD, UN, FI

SUBJECT: USPOLICY TOWARDS NFZ IN NORTHER EUROPE

REF: (A) STATE 269513 DEC 9, 1974; (B) HELSINKI 2490
DEC 10, 1974; (C) HELSINKI A-043 (NOTAL);
(D) STOCKHOLM 5450 DEC 7, 1974; (E) HELSINKI 1153,
MAY 28, 1975; (F) OSLO 2153, MAY 28, 1975

1.FINNS CONTINUE PUSH IDEA OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE
ZONE IN NORTHERN EUROPE (NFZNE) POPULARLY KNOW
KEKKONEN PLAN. AMONG OTHER MATTERS, KEKKONEN OBTAINED
TITO'S ENDORSEMENT OF NFZNE ON HIS MARCH 21-25 TRIP
TO YUGOSLAVIA. KEKKONEN SAID IN INTERVIEW CARRIED
OVER FINNISH TV ON APRIL 6 THAT FINLAND INTENDED TO
RAISE IN ALL POSSIBLE CONTEXTS IDEA OF DECLARING
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NORDIC COUNTRIES A NFZ. KEKKONEN PREDICTED IN SAME

INTERVIEW THAT WHEN "CSCE HAD BROUGHT THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE CLOSER TOGETHER, PLAN WOULD RECEIVE NEW LIFE." (KEKKONEN SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD UK AMBASSADOR THE TV PROGRAM WAS TAPED ONE MONTH BEFORE BROADCAST AND THAT HE WOULD URGE THE UN TO PICK UP BALL ON NFZ IN NORTHERN EUROPE). CONSERVATIVE PARTY, WHICH IS MOST FRIENDLY TO WEST AMONG FINLAND'S FOUR MAJOR PARTIES, ENDORSED NFZNE AT ITS MAY 23-25 CONGRESS.

2. NORWEGIANS ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSON ON APRIL 2 HAVE SPOKEN PUBLICLY AGAINST NFZNE. PUBLIC POSITION OF SWEDES, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN LESS CLEAR CUT. PRIMEMIN PALME, SWEDISH AMB TO HELSINKI (SEE REF C), AND I ASSUME OTHER SWEDISH OFFICIALS, PRIVATELY SPEAK AGAINST NFZNE, BUT SWEDISH SPOKESMEN PUBLICLY DO NOT GO BEYOND SAYING NFZNE SHOULD BE STUDIED, OR COULD BE ACCEPTABLE IF EXTENDED TO INCLUDE SOVIET TERRITORY.

3. IN HIS APRIL 6 TV INTERVIEW KEKKONEN CONCEDED THAT OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES OPPOSED NFZNE BUT INDICATED HE WOULD NOT BE DETERRED. HIS CONTINUED PUSHING OF PLAN ADDS TO EXISTING STRAINS ON NORDIC SOLIDARITY (REF C) AND RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS MOTIVATION. AFTER A GOOD DEAL OF DISCUSSION WITH ALL CONCERNED, I AM OF OPINION THAT KEKKONEN'S MOTIVATION IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ZERO IN ON. MANY IN WEST ARE OF OPINION THAT NFZNE WAS CONCOCTED PRIMARILY TO PLEASE FINLAND'S EASTERN NEIGHBOR. SOME FINNS FEEL THAT NFZNE WAS LAUNCHED NOT SO MUCH IN HOPE IT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, BUT RATHER TO INHIBIT DANES AND ESPECIALLY NORWEGIANS FROM UPSETTING SO-CALLED "NORDIC BALANCE" BY DEPARTING FROM THEIR NON-NUCLEAR POLICY. ANOTHER CONJECTURE IS THAT NFZNE IS KEKKONEN'S WAY OF KEEPING HIMSELF IN WORLD SPOTLIGHT. UNQUESTIONABLY HE ENJOYS PLAYING ROLE OF PEACEMAKER OF NORTH; I BELIEVE THAT KEKKONEN DESPITE HIS ADVANCED AGE IS LOOKING FOR NEW FIELDS TO CONQUER AFTER CSCE CONFERENCE WHICH HE HAS SO

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STRONGLY PROMOTED. IN MY ESTIMATION, HIS MOTIVATION IS A COMBINATION OF ALL OF THESE.

4. SOME MAY ASK WHAT US CAN DO ABOUT NFZNE IF NORWEGIAN AND DANISH EFFORTS TO HEAD IT OFF HAVE BEEN UNAVAILING. ONE THING US COULD DO IS MAKE IT CLEAR TO KEKKONEN AND/OR OTHER HIGH GOV OFFICIALS IN DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES THAT FINLAND, IN

PUSHING NFZNE, IS GETTING INVOLVED IN CONFLICTING SECURITY INTERESTS OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT, CONTRARY TO FINNISH PROFESSION DURING MANY YEARS OF A DESIRE TO STAY OUT OF GREAT POWER CONFLICTS. THE FINNS KNOW THAT THIS IS WHAT NFZNE AS NOW CONCEIVED INVOLVES BUT US, UNLIKE THOSE NORDIC COUNTRIES WHO HAVE OPENLY DENOUNCED PLAN, IS A GREAT POWER AND HAS NEVER REALLY LAID IT ON LINE WITH GOF. OUR GUIDANCE ON NFZNE (REF A) HAS BEEN COUCHED IN TERMS OF LIKELY INABILITY TO SUPPORT PLAN RATHER THAN FORTHRIGHT OPPOSITION TO IT.

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5. FURTHER MORE, US HANDLING OF NFZNE HAS LARGELY KEPT FROM PUBLIC IN FINLAND OUR NEGATIVE VIEW OF IT. FONMIN KARJALAINEN IN MARCH 1975 MAGAZINE INTERVIEW SAID IN ANSWER TO QUERY ABOUT US ATTITUDE TOWARD NFZNE, THAT "WE HAVE NOT OFFICIALLY DISCUSSED THIS,

BUT I UNDERSTAND THAT US IN ANY EVENT IS ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN ALL STUDIES RELATED TO NFZS." THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY PAPER WROTE ON APRIL 4 THAT SOVIE ATTITUDE TO NFZNE "IS WELL KNOWN BUT UNITED STATES HAS NOT EXPRESSED HER VIEWS, ALTHOUGH US POSITION MIGHT BE INFERRED FROM SYMINGTON US SPEECH." MFA POLITICAL DEPARTMENT SECTION HEAD JAAKKO BLOMBERG (SOCIAL DEMOCRAT) WROTE IN SPECIAL ISSUE OF ULKOPOLITIIKKA DEVOTED TO NFZNE THAT US HAD NEVER SPECIFICALLY EXPRESSED ITS OPINION ON A NORDIC NFZ. THUS, ANOTHER THING US COULD DO IS CONFIDENTIAL

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TAKE A PUBLIC STAND ON NFZNE.

6. WE REALIZE FULL WELL THAT QUESTION OF US ACTION IN THIS MATTER IS LARGELY DEPENDENT ON FACTORS OUTSIDE US-FINNISH RELATIONS, SUCH AS (A) OURN GENERAL POLICY ON NFZS, (B) QUESTION OF NFZNE IN RELATION TO EUROPE-WIDE CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS MBFR, (C) US-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS SUCH AS SALT, (D) CONSIDERATION OF SITUATION IN SWEDEN WHICH IS NOT A NATO ALLY AND (E) PARTICULARLY HOW SUCH ACTION MIGHT EFFECT NORWEGIAN AND DANISH OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES. WE ALSO AWARE THAT IN BROAD SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE US ACTIONS, THE CLOSER THESE COME TO OPEN US OPPOSITION TO NFZNE, THE MORE PROBABLE WILL BE SOME STRAIN ON US-FINNISH RELATIONS. AT SAME TIME, WE FEEL THAT SERIOUS NEGATIVE EFFECT WHICH IMPLEMENTATION OF NFZNE WOULD HAVE ON STRENGTH OF NATO IS MORE IMPORTANT CONCERN -- AND REALLY HEART OF MATTER.

7. WE ARE UNCERTAIN WHAT EFFECT CCD EXPERT STUDY OF NFZS IN GENERAL WILL HAVE ON FUTURE OF NFZNE. DESPITE KEKKONEN'S ASSURANCE TO UK AMBASSADOR (PARA 1 ABOVE), WE THINK IT WOULD BE RISKY TO ASSUME THAT KEKKONEN WILL ALLOW EXPERT STUDY TO PUT AN END TO HIS PET PROJECT. WE THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT FINNS WILL TRY TO SHAPE AND INTERPRET EXPERT STUDY TO ADVANCE NFZNE. THIS POSSIBILITY EMBASSY PROPOSES TO INVESTIGATE THROUGH CONTACT WITH FINNISH EXPERT, PROFESSOR KEIJO KORHONEN.

8. AS A MINIMUM, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO MFA US VIEWS ON NFZNE SO AS TO STOP PUBLIC ASSERTIONS BY FINNISH OFFICIALS THAT US HAS NEVER STATED ITS VIEWS ABOUT NFZNE. DEPT AND INFO ADDRESSEES MAY HAVE OTHER IDEAS ON WHETHER US SHOULD OR COULD DO SOMETHING MORE TO

INSURE THAT NFZNE DOES NOT GROW INTO A REAL DANGER
FOR NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK. PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE
IS TO URGE THAT NFZNE BE CONSIDERED A LONG-TERM
PROBLEM WHICH WE SHOULD FACE UP TO NOW BEFORE IT
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GAINS WIDER SUPPORT IN AND OUT OF FINLAND, AND
SOLICIT VIEWS ESPECIALLY FROM AMEMB OSLO AND COPENHAGEN
ON WHAT IF ANYTHING SHOULD DO ABOUT NFZNE PROPOSAL.
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